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Edmonton Oilers Penalty Kill Scoring Chances 2010-2011

Remember the Diamond Penalty Kill?  Remember how bad it was when executed by the 2010-2011 Edmonton Oilers?  Remember how it looked like the Oilers were purposefully moving out of position when shorthanded?  It was so bad that Tom Renney and Ralph Kreuger finally gave up on it and went back to the traditional box.  Before they did however, the Oilers in the DPK posted one of the worst 75 days of penalty killing ever.

We'd all like to forget the Oilers' special teams in 2010-2011, but before we do, it's worth checking out the scoring chances numbers behind one of the worst penalty kills since expansion.

Star-divide

PKTOI = total penalty kill time on ice; TCA = season total penalty kill chances against; CA/15 = player on-ice scoring chances against per 15 minutes of power play time; PKGA = total penalty kill goals against on ice; TCF/PKGA = penalty kill chances for divided by penalty kill goals against, or opponent's conversion ratio; %CONA = opponent's conversion ratio expressed as a percentage.

*Tables are sortable by column, simply click the header row, the initial sort is CA/15

Player  PKTOI TCA CA/15 PKGA TCA/PKGA %CONA
Ryan Jones 171.72 114 9.958 20 5.700 0.175
Andrew Cogliano 223.02 153 10.291 27 5.667 0.176
Shawn Horcoff 73.37 51 10.427 18 2.833 0.353
Liam Reddox 130.63 95 10.908 17 5.588 0.179
Fwd Average 11.028 5.326 0.188
Dustin Penner 91.95 68 11.093 11 6.182 0.162
Colin Fraser 177.58 133 11.234 18 7.389 0.135
Jordan Eberle 46.68 38 12.210 16 2.375 0.421

 

There is an underlying theme to the numbers throughout this article.  Anyone involved in the DPK, even if they got to play the box for four months, have numbers that are far worse than those players not heavily exposed to the DPK.

Andrew Cogliano and Ryan Jones were both third options on the PK for most of the DPK stretch.  When injuries set in to Shawn Horcoff and Jordan Eberle was pulled from the PK, both Cogliano and Jones stepped into much larger roles.  Buffered by limited exposure to the DPK, the two came out on top in the CA/15 department.

Now, sort by %CONA.  I'll give you a second to compose yourself after seeing Horcoff and Eberle's conversion against numbers.

Player  PKTOI TSCA CA/15 PKGA CA/GA %CONA
Jeff Petry 44.82 28 9.372 5 5.600 0.179
Jason Strudwick 83.97 54 9.647 8 6.750 0.148
Jim Vandermeer 128.93 87 10.122 14 6.214 0.161
Ladislav Smid 208.42 151 10.868 28 5.393 0.185
Def Average

11.190
5.418 0.185
Tom Gilbert 265.00 204 11.547 42 4.857 0.206
Theo Peckham 178.77 138 11.579 24 5.750 0.174
Ryan Whitney 94.60 82 13.002 15 5.467 0.183

 

Whitney's season was cut short in the midst of the transition away from the DPK in December.  That's reflected in his TSCA.  As long as the Oilers don't go back to the DPK, Whitney's PK numbers are bound to improve in 2011-12.  Theo Peckham and Tom Gilbert were primary penalty killers for the entire course of the DPK, reflected in their numbers. 

Jeff Petry had no exposure to the DPK and was a second-pairing player through the back half of the season, usually facing lesser competition.

 

Player  PKTOI TSCA CA/15 PKGA CA/GA %CONA
Taylor Chorney 7.95 3 5.660 1 3.000 0.333
Jean-Francois Jacques 2.27 1 6.618 0
0.000
Chris Vande Velde 17.12 9 7.887 2 4.500 0.222
Kurtis Foster 11.63 8 10.315 2 4.000 0.250
Ales Hemsky 37.28 31 12.472 4 7.750 0.129
Sam Gagner 25.60 24 14.063 6 4.000 0.250
Ryan O`Marra 10.70 13 18.224 1 13.000 0.077
Magnus Paajarvi 2.12 3 21.260 0
0.000
Gilbert Brule 6.75 10 22.222 0
0.000
Steve MacIntyre 0.05 1 300.000 0
0.000

 

There isn't much to look at with the leftovers except for some fun and curious numbers.  Taylor Chorney had 2 PK chances for and 3 against in only 8 minutes of PK time, but gave up a goal on one of the chances against.  Chris Vande Velde showed extremely well in a very limited role and sample size against second-tier competition.  With his faceoff prowess and seemingly decent instincts short-handed, he could challenge for the 4th line center role in 2011-12.

Finally, Steve MacIntyre's lone chance in a couple of seconds on the power play makes for some fun ratios.

Player  PKTOI TSCA CA/15 PKGA CA/GA %CONA
Martin Gerber 16.50 9 8.184 1 9.000 0.111
Devan Dubnyk 238.25 173 10.892 25 6.920 0.145
Nikolai Khabibulin 266.29 199 11.210 48 4.146 0.241

 

The effects of the DPK are most evident amongst the goaltenders.  The bulk of Devan Dubnyk's work came after the switch back to the box and it shows.  Nikolai Khabibulin's numbers are mind-blowing.  Opponents scored on every fourth scoring chance against Khabibulin.  His chances against were bad, but not much worse than Dubnyk's numbers.  It's the conversion rate that doomed Khabibulin.  Go back to the linked articles in the introduction and look how often the DPK left one or two guys alone in front.  The frames captured in those articles translate directly to Khabibulin's %CONA.

The DPK was such a terribly implemented and executed strategy that I don't believe we can draw any conclusions from any of this data other than the Oilers should never play the DPK again.

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On the flip-side

The DPK put us in the hole by Christmas. If I’m correct in my assumption this was the strategy.

I bet an experienced group of players could pull it off, but obviously that wasn’t the case here. Tanking while making it look like you’re trying is an artform which we can safely say our team has elevated to a science.

Trying something new is good. Discontinuing that plan when it’s not working is common sense. Not doing so is either blatantly stupid or incredibly devious. I refuse to believe Tom Renney is stupid.

by David S on Jun 13, 2011 11:20 AM MDT reply actions  

 Renney must have swallowed his pride and was totally ok with tanking, while putting the kids in the kids in their place to make them learn the hard way early on.

I wonder? Does the switch back to the box PK correlate with the rash of injuries the team had and the realization that a horrendous pk was no longer needed to keep the team in last place?

The Edmonton Oilers - All we do is win!!

by OilLeak on Jun 13, 2011 11:35 AM MDT up reply actions  

My guess is the directive to submarine the team came right from Katz. NHL coaches are well paid and part of the job is the ability to “swallow your pride”. Quinn couldn’t do that, so he was canned.

If you think of the NHL as a credible version of the WWE, then alot of things start to make sense.

by David S on Jun 13, 2011 11:49 AM MDT up reply actions  

In that Tom Renney used the diamond strategy very effectively when he was with the Rangers I really don’t think he was using it for the purpose of losing. He probably persisted with it because he figured that the long-term gain (a solid penalty kill) would be worth it, except that it never really got better, so he eventually changed strategies. The coaches and players want to win.

The biggest fanana of the Havana Bananas.

by Scott Reynolds on Jun 13, 2011 12:14 PM MDT up reply actions  

I’d bet Renney had a far more experienced roster in New York.

by David S on Jun 13, 2011 3:58 PM MDT up reply actions  

There was a mix. Marc Staal led the blueliners in ice time as a 22 year-old sophomore, and Dan Girardi was next in line in his third NHL season at age 24. There was more experience up front, but Ryan Callahan and Brandon Dubinsky were both second-year players among the top six forwards. Regardless, I’m quite sure that he was using the strategy in both New York and Edmonton because he thinks it works well.

The biggest fanana of the Havana Bananas.

by Scott Reynolds on Jun 13, 2011 4:23 PM MDT up reply actions  

It probably works a little bit better with Lunqvist rather than Khabibulin….

by MathMan on Jun 13, 2011 4:52 PM MDT up reply actions  

That said, if the SA/60 rates for the Rangers in 2007-2009 are anything to go by, it really did work.

by MathMan on Jun 13, 2011 5:03 PM MDT up reply actions  

Going from NK/DPK to Dubnyk in %CONA saves 19 goals over NK’s 199 chances against. That would move the Oil from last in goal differential at -69 to -50 leapfroggin COL (-66) and OTT (-55) and likely taking EDM out of the basement. Thank the Hockey Gods that Renney bought into the rebuild and tanked the Oil just enough to keep that first overall draft pick!

by Oi on Jun 13, 2011 11:23 AM MDT reply actions  

There is a reason NK is MVP

Success is not a goal..its a byproduct

by SumOil on Jun 13, 2011 11:39 AM MDT up reply actions  

most important part of the rebuild!

Success is not a goal..its a byproduct

by SumOil on Jun 13, 2011 11:40 AM MDT up reply actions  

The DPK was such a terribly implemented and executed strategy that I don’t believe we can draw any conclusions from any of this data other than the Oilers should never play the DPK again.

Does Renney take the heat for the DPK, or was one of the other coaches in charge of PK? I ask because the results were so horrendous – even before any decision to ‘tank’ could have been made – that you wouldn’t want that person anywhere near special teams again. Sure, the players implemented badly, but who takes the heat for conceptualising this steaming pile of bear crap?

by Yeti# on Jun 13, 2011 11:54 AM MDT reply actions  

In the end-run, Katz. The decision to deep-six the team was probably made last summer.

by David S on Jun 13, 2011 12:06 PM MDT up reply actions  

Everyone.

The problem with the diamond is that it is inherently complex, especially when the opposition rotates.

It works fantastic if the other team is playing NHL 2011 on you are rolls out the umbrella formation all the time, but against any other alignment it takes not only good footwork, but a lot of smarts.

You need to understand how to read passing lanes, how to recognize shooting positions, how to understand what the easiest, hardest pass is for the puck carrier. In other words, you need to process a lot of information very quickly.

For instance If I’m a LH shot and I’m parked on the LW half boards at the hash marks. The PKer on that side of the diamond is a forward, as is the player at the top of the diamond. The job of the forward closest to the puck is to apply pressure, as well as block off the passing routes to the dangerous areas. The forward at the top has to cover the high slot as well as the pointmen. The D playing the other side of the diamond has to cover the middle of the zone, as well as being prepared to drop low towards the net for additional coverage. The other defenceman plays in front of the goalie.

Going back to me on the boards, as a PK, you want to clear out the forward(s) in front of the net and give him a shot from that position. It’s a bad angle and your goaltender should stop it all of the time. Also, you want to cut off all of the passes into the danger areas and only give him the option to shoot (poor chance) or bring it low (either skate it down or pass it down.

That’s all well and good, the problems result from the following:

1. The puck generally moves faster than you can think & react.

2. The nature of the diamond actually allows easier odd man situations.

The best way to run a PP is to break it down into the smallest possible odd man situation. A 2 on 1 play that leads to a possible scoring chance has a far more liklihood of succeeding than a 3 on 2/4 on 3/5 on 4. The diamond actually encourages more 2 on 1 play, but a successful diamond will press those oppositions farther out. Allowing a 2 on 1 on the half boards is significantly better than a 2 on 1 on the crease.

So combining slow read & react times with a system that encourages the PP to get the matches it needs to will result in an awful PK.

Having a terrible goaltender probably just compounded that.

In theory, there is little difference between practice and theory, but in practice there is!

by dawgbone98 on Jun 13, 2011 12:15 PM MDT up reply actions  

So in other words

The DPK can only be successfully run by experienced, quality players.

by David S on Jun 13, 2011 12:44 PM MDT up reply actions  

Thanks – that’s very helpful! At some point this was a failure of coaching – i.e. to realise that they didn’t have the necessary players to pull this off.
As per David S, I’m also guessing that this is why we keep signing college grads: to one day have players with the smarts to execute this kind of plan.

by Yeti# on Jun 13, 2011 2:14 PM MDT up reply actions  

Failure only if you measure success by having a decent PK. My contention is that the measure was different, and in fact the coaches succeeded rather spectacularly. Seriously, any of us here could look at the roster and conclude the DPK would not succeed. I have to think Renney and Krueger made the same call. Remember, winning was not on the agenda last year.

by David S on Jun 13, 2011 3:56 PM MDT up reply actions  

HUH??

“There is an underlying theme to the numbers throughout this article. Anyone involved in the DPK, even if they got to play the box for four months, have numbers that are far worse than those players not heavily exposed to the DPK.

Andrew Cogliano and Ryan Jones were both third options on the PK for most of the DPK stretch. When injuries set in to Shawn Horcoff and Jordan Eberle was pulled from the PK, both Cogliano and Jones stepped into much larger roles. Buffered by limited exposure to the DPK, the two came out on top in the CA/15 department."

Not sure how buffered Cogliano, and to a lesser degree, Jones were. For Oct, Nov and Dec. Horcoff put in about 49 minutes playing short handed, Cogliano put in 71 minutes and Jones put in 42 minutes. Your statement is more accurate if you include only Oct and Nov. Then Horcoff has about 43 minutes, Cogliano has 39 and Jones has 15. But even so, to say 4 minutes is a difference maker is a stretch. I don’t think you can make the agrument that Cogliano’s good numbers are attributable wholly to a change in system.

by ghs on Jun 13, 2011 3:27 PM MDT reply actions  

The transition out of the DPK started in the first week of December. They were almost completely out of the DPK by December 15, Hence the “75 days” comment above.

Editor of The Copper & Blue, and leader of The Cult Of Hartikainen.

by Derek Zona on Jun 13, 2011 7:36 PM MDT up reply actions  

Logic

Okay, if you take it to December 15th (69 days), then Horcoff has played 48.44 on the penalty kill, Cogliano has played 58.37 and Jones has played 29.43 minutes. Your claim is that since Cogliano was not heavily exposed to the DPK his numbers are better than those that were exposed, BUT Cogliano was exposed to the DPK for MORE minutes than Horcoff, who you use as an example of a player whose numbers were hurt by the DPK.

 Simply put: your argument against the DPK doesn’t work, because this statement:

“Anyone involved in the DPK, even if they got to play the box for four months, have numbers that are far worse than those players not heavily exposed to the DPK”

is simply untrue.

Not saying the DPK is a good system, just saying you haven’t proved it is at fault.

by ghs on Jun 14, 2011 12:45 AM MDT up reply actions  

Players, not plays. Always.

by Geeezeus on Jun 14, 2011 8:06 AM MDT reply actions  

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