How Long Should A Team Stick With Average Management?
Beginning with "Darryl Sutter - Decidedly Average" and continuing through "Marginal Playoff Efficiency - Marginal Spending Where The Playoffs Matter", I spent the month of October attempting to measure management efficiency using cap expenditure as a constant. Each new metric came at the behest of commenters or an e-mailers, both of which were eager to suggest new and improved methodologies to measure management performance. No matter which spending-based methodology I applied to post-lockout performance, Darryl Sutter was always within an arm's length of league average. Only four teams have spent more against the cap than Darryl Sutter's Flames. At the same time, the Flames never finished higher than 7th or lower than 15th in points in the NHL.
In wrapping up the first Sutter article, I wrote:
Since 2005, Sutter has traded 2 first round picks, 6 second round picks, 3 third round picks, 2 fourth round picks, 1 fifth round pick, and 1 seventh round pick. He's traded for 1 first round pick, 2 second round picks, 2 third round picks, 2 fourth round picks, 1 fifth round pick, and 1 seventh round pick. His net loss in five years has been 1 first round pick, 4 second round picks, and 1 third round pick.
Sutter also traded away a young soft-minutes center in Matthew Lombardi for an older, more-expensive soft-minutes center in Olli Jokinen. He dealt for aging defenseman Steve Staios and his $2,700,000 million contract in 2010. He attempted to fix the Jokinen mistake by trading him to New York for fourth line winger and power play specialist Ales Kotalik's two remaining years at $3,000,000 each.
Eventually Sutter's attempts to give away cheap contracts and draft picks will catch up with the Flames. He'll be forced to dump a contract in Abbotsford to get under the cap or sell off Flame forever Jarome Iginla to restock the system. Until then, however, Darryl Sutter and the Calgary Flames will remain decidedly average.
Of course, the Flames have not remained decidedly average - through the first three months of the season, the Flames are twenty-third in points earned per game. They're currently on pace to finish the season with eighty points, a low not seen since 2002-03. Even though the Flames' goal differential hovers near even (nineteenth in the league) and their even strength goal differential is positive (fifteenth in the league), the cold start was enough for the Flames ownership and Sutter was dispatched back to the family compound in Red Deer. Six years years of average management and team performance was fine with management, but three months of a cold streak was unacceptable.
One argument against dispatching Sutter earlier than this year goes something like this: "Ostensibly, these 30 men are the best general managers NHL team's can find, of course some are going to be at the top, some average, some at the bottom. But firing them doesn't guarantee improvement - these are the best."
The argument strikes me as rather insane. First, assuming the thirty men in charge of NHL franchises are currently the most capable for those jobs is foolish. Each year, general managers are hired and fired, and though most of them are in a pre-set pool of long-time hockey men, like Theo Epstein in baseball, there are men outside of the inner circle of the NHL old boys network who are capable of running an NHL team.
Second, staying with an average management staff strictly because there is a chance the next management staff might be below average is the hallmark of an ownership group either fat and happy, making money hand over fist regardless of on-ice performance (Oilers, Leafs) or an ownership group managing not to lose, rather than managing to win. What that says about ownership that stays with bottom-of-the-barrel management, I have no idea. Don Waddell survived for ten years in Atlanta and delivered only one playoff appearance. Doug MacLean survived for seven years in Columbus and the Blue Jackets never topped eighty points. Mike Milbury survived for eleven years on Long Island despite only three playoff appearances for a franchise that had missed the playoffs six times in the previous twenty-three seasons. These are edge cases though, to call the ownership situations in those three cities "poor" is an understatement. However, given this context, it's no surprise that Darryl Sutter survived for half of a decade.
The question remains though: how long should an NHL owner stick with an average general manager? If sample size is an issue, what is the minimum time period owners should use to measure management effectiveness? Is the risk of hiring an even worse general manager worth holding onto a management team that gives your team no shot to win?
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Depends
If its brand new management (i.e. no previous history) it could take 4 to 5 years just to get a baseline read/confirmation on whether or not they are average. No more than 5 imo.
If its management that has previous history (sometimes management is in a no win situation so you may be completely sure going in and may wish to take a chance) then 2 or 3 years should be plenty.
If the manager was in an ‘okay’ situation somewhere else, for 3 to 4 years, and did nothing with it, then your answer is Zero years. Or 1 if you need a caretaker (does the leg work for you but has no final says) while you are looking for a better option.
I think the only thing that takes time to understand is a draft, but you can still judge if the correct pick was made, just like you can still judge the decisions made when GMs sign free agents or make trades.
Editor of The Copper & Blue, and leader of The Cult Of Hartikainen.
If your judgement is that good that fast then you (or I or whoever) should be the GM.
Even a horrible GM like Waddell gets more than a couple of years. The trade for Stefan was bad (no question) – as the trade never had to be made – BUT it wasn’t atrocious (given the understandable need to make a splash… just paid too much). People forget how bad that top-end of the 1999 draft was. I like to think I would have taken the keys away just prior to the 2002 draft – the moment I knew he was going to take Lehtonen over Bouwmeester. That kind of thinking, combined with an inability to get much burn from his expansion draft work and the lack of a solid prospect foundation would have tipped the balance against him imo.
That is still 1 expansion draft, 3 entry drafts, 3 trade deadlines and 3 full seasons of play… and Waddell IS a bad GM…
by Jaysen Knight on Jan 3, 2011 1:07 AM MST up reply actions
I have read somewhere that it takes 7 years to effectivly judge a GM. Which I think is ridiculous. But you also have to consider what he starts with to. A guy who comes into a team that has a lot of good pieces already in place, he doesnt have to do much to look good. But a guy who comes into a bad situation has to do a lot just to look average.
That being said I would give a guy 2 seasons, which should be long enough to see a trend starting. If he looks average, give him another coulple seasons to see which way he goes. If he hasnt made a solid impact by then, time to go. There are plenty of guys around that know the game and know the players that it shouldnt be hard to find someone capable.
I have read somewhere that it takes 7 years to effectivly judge a GM.
I’d love to read that source if you can find it.
Editor of The Copper & Blue, and leader of The Cult Of Hartikainen.
Try Gabe
In the final paragraph of this post about the silly Forbes GM rankings.
Lighthouse Hockey: And you shall know us by the fraying of our hips.
It’s an interesting question. I think one of the problems with having a quick hook on a GM is that he ends up making silly short term maneuvers to keep his job. I can recall Dave Taylor getting the old ‘make the playoffs or you’re out’ mandate, and he ended up dealing Denis Grebeskhov in a trade for Mark Parrish and Brent Sopel. I suspect Don Waddell wanted to make a huge splash in 2007, so he dealt Brayden Coburn and a 1st round pick for Alexei Zhitnik and Keith Tkachuk.
Oftentimes the worst thing for a franchise is fluky, unsustainable success, and I think there’s really no better example of that phenomenon than the Flames. Sutter was constantly trying to make that one last move to turn his team into a Cup contender, not really realizing that it wasn’t that close. Who knows how far the Flames are from being good again – they certainly have to stop signing mediocre talents to 5 and 6 year contracts.
So yeah, this is all one way of saying that I don’t have an answer. On the one hand, you want to ensure your GM doesn’t make impatient moves. On the other hand, you want to be able to fire him quickly if he starts to (and they don’t pan out). It’s a difficult balance to strike.
I think it’s important to state that there is a difference between progress and success. Hiring a GM for the Oilers in the summer of 2010 shouldn’t come with the requirement that there be success (definition is open-ended) in 3 years.
That is where you run into issues with the examples you provided. That being said, you should see tangible improvements every year and fewer and fewer “mistake” moves.
In theory, there is little difference between practice and theory, but in practice there is!

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